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CHAPTER 14 
Land Use Law 
RICHARD G. HUBER. 
A. ZONING 
§14.I. "Anti-mob" zoning law. Zoning, which started out its life 
under attack as.a radical destruction of man's control over his real 
property, is now much more often attacked as a conservative device 
used largely to protect land values and a particular way of li~e. With-
out indulging in polemics, it is obvious that low density zoning, com-
bined with rapidly increasing land costs and urban J>Qpulation growth, 
together have prevented the development of low and moderate income 
housing in many suburban communities. Some commentators have 
indeed forecast that within the next ten years zoning will cease to 
exist, just as have the Jim-Crow laws, since present zoning tends to 
reflect social and economic policies that are already largely history. 
Everyone clearly recognizes the crisis in our llation's housing and the 
need to take action to increase substantially the rate of housing con-
struction. Prominent in most such thinking is the need for the building 
of low. and moderate income housing, that is, housing whose construc-
tion and operation costs need in some part to be subsidized if rent and 
other costs are to be kept at the levels required for those groups whom 
the housing serves. The pressures to require suburban communities to 
encourage rather than discourage such housing within their borders 
are continually mounting. During the 1969 SURVEY year the General 
Court adopted legislation that at least constitutes the beginning of the 
necessary new look in land use control. Its importance as a model as 
well as its own specific merits make discussion desirable. 
Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 added new sections to Chapter 40B 
of the General Laws.1 The new law applies solely to low and moderate 
income housing, built under state or federa1 programs. Thus only 
public agencies and nonprofit or limited dividend corporations2 can 
use the law. The essence of Section 21 lies in the concept of a compre-
hensive premit. Under this section a board of appeals will, upon re-
quest of a developer of the type described above, conduct a hearing 
upon an application for a permit. All other local agencies that issue 
permits or give approvals relating to building of such housing3 are 
RICHAlID G. HUBEIl is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§14.1. 1 The new sections are 20 through 25. In addition, a new Section 5A 
is added to G.L., Co 25B, setting up the five-man housing appeals committee. 
l! The latter are set up under G.L., c. 121A. 
8 The statute refers to "local boards," which are defined in Section 20 as fol-
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notified and asked for their recommendations. A public hearing, to 
which all boards interested are requested to send representatives, is 
held within 30 days of the application. The board of appeals can 
exercise the same powers in respect of the application as all the sep-
arate officials and boards could. A board decision, based on a majority 
vote, must be made within 40 days of the hearing. Failure to conduct 
the hearing or to render the decision within the allocated time-or 
time as extended by the board and applicant-will result in an auto-
matic issuance of a comprehensive permit. 
1£ a person is aggrieved by the grant or approval he may appeal 
directly to the superior court, using the regular appellate procedure for 
review of decisions of zoning boards of appeals.' More interesting and 
important, however, is the appellate machinery set up for an unsuccess-
ful applicant. A housing appeals committee has been organized under 
the statute in the Department of Community Affairs, and it can take 
and decide appeals in relatively short time periods. Its decision, ar-
rived at by majority vote and required to be in written form, can be 
appealed to the superior court. 
If the local decision has denied the permit, the housing appeals com-
mittee has jurisdiction to determine if the decision was reasonable and 
"consistent with local needs." In those situations in which the compre-
hensive permit was granted but subjected to conditions and require-
ments, an appeal permits the committee to determine if the conditions 
make the housing "uneconomic" and are "consistent with local needs."11 
While there has been some criticism of the definition, "uneconomic" 
is generally defined in terms of imposing financial burdens of the type 
that will prevent the particular applicant from being able to build the 
proposed housing successfully.G "Consistent with local needs" is a much 
more detailed and confusing concept in the statute.7 The term requires 
consideration of regional as well as local needs for the housing, and 
local health, safety and general welfare factors. A mathematical formula 
involving the present dedication of housing units and land area to 
these types of housing, and the amount of land area to be used for 
these purposes in anyone year, limits the immediate impact of the 
statute to one apparently thought manageable by the General Court.8 
The committee can, under the standards of its review, direct the issu-
ance of a comprehensive approval or order the removal or modification 
of conditions. The statute also states that, if a given decision is consis-
lows: .. 'Local Board: any town or city board of survey, board of health, board of 
subdivision control appeals, planning board, building inspector or the officer or 
board having supervision of the construction of buildings or the power of enforc· 
ing municipal building laws, or city councilor board of selectmen." 
, G.L., c. 4OA, §21, sets out the procedure. 
II Chapter SOA, the State Administrative Procedure Act, governs this appeal. 
6 The full definition is set out in G.L., c. 40B, §20. 
7 This, too, is defined in Section 20. 
8 Of the communities in the Metropolitan Area Planning Council, only Malden 
seems to meet the statutory requirements relating to area and number of units 
and is thus not required to permit an otherwise qualified applicant to build. 
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tent with local needs under the statute, it shall not be annulled or 
modified merely because the housing project would be uneconomic. 
It would seem that much more heat than light has developed in con-
nection with this statute. Its noteworthy accomplishments are several, 
but more in the policy area than in the functional. The concept of a 
comprehensive permit or approval would remove one of the many 
nightmares for all developers, if applied generally and not just to low 
and moderate income housing. Probably of even greater importance is 
the imposition of a regional standard and the review of a local decision 
by a: state board. These two points recognize that purely local deci-
sions are not acceptable in the context, at least, of our housing prob-
lems. It seems very appropriate that housing problems of the poor and 
lower middle income groups should be the ones that break the heavily 
local nature of most zoning decisions. 
Obvious objections to the act also exist. Planners may well object to 
the use of the board of appeals under the Zoning Enabling Act rather 
than the municipal planning board as the agent to grant the compre-
hensive permit. !n many communities little love seems to be lost be-
tween these two bodies but, beyond this political fact, the planning 
board is created to develop the background, overview, and plan of the 
municipality and, theoretically, would be more conscious of the many 
factors that might properly go into the comprehensive permit or ap-
proval decision. 
Even more crucially, however, the act fails to vest any authority in 
the board of appeals to reduce or limit the local zoning ordinance or 
by-law standards. The name given this act, the anti-snob zoning law, 
creates the impression that zoning can be varied if the board of appeals 
so desires. But the statute gives no such power, and the board, under 
the act, has the same powers as it does generally in the zoning area-
it can grant variances, 'and, when it is the designated body and has 
been delegated specific power, it can grant special permits for excep-
tions. Variances, as often noted, are difficult to grant if aU legal require-
ments are precisely followed.1I The need for the present act, despite 
publicity through the various media. is not to encourage low and 
moderate income housing in Dover or Pride's Crossing - or even much 
such housiag in Needham and Wellesley - but to make it possible in 
those suburbs closest to the center city, such as Cambridge and Brook-
line. In these communities land prices are scaled to luxury building, 
and a developer cannot, even with subsidies, build economic housing 
for low and moderate income families without exemption from some 
aspects of zoning, generally those relating to density or type of residen-
tial building. 
The new act does much and evidences the initial commitment of the 
General Court towards this particular approach to solving our housing 
problems. Truly effective results will not be obtained, however, until 
zoning changes can be granted at the time the comprehensive approval 
II This point is briefly discuued in §14.7 infra. 
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is sought. The problem of housing continues to become ever more 
urgent, and the General Court can be expected to continue developing 
the approach of this act until it becomes a fully feasible and much used 
process. 
§14.2. Nonconforming uses: Effect of nonprocurement of license 
from local board of health. Generally speaking, under G.L., c. 40A, 
§5, all uses of land in existence at the time of the enactment of a 
zoning law must be allowed to continue even if they do not conform 
with the new zoning scheme. In Board of Selectmen of Wrentham v. 
Monson,! a portion of land in question was, prior to the passing of a 
zoning ordinance prohibiting the use of mobile homes and trailers in 
Wrentham, used for trailer storage and short-term mobile home park-
ing in conjunction with adjoining property situated in Foxboro. The 
property owner had failed, however, to procure a license from the local 
board of health for this use, a violation of the General Laws.2 
Bringing a bill in equity, the selectmen, as plaintiffs, requested that 
the defendant be enjoined from using the Wrentham property for 
mobile home purposes. They contended that, in order for a noncon-
forming use to continue validly, it may not be in violation of the law.8 
Under this theory they claimed that, by operating without the re-
quired license, the mobile home was illegal and not protected. The 
issue, as stated by the Court, was "whether ~ failure to a)mply with 
lice?se regulatio!lLQestw~the. ~(c;tJt;ue,,,.aft-~erwise valid 
nonconfo .. rming u~/,~ The point had not been decided previously in 
M"assaCliusetts. 
The plaintiffs based their claim solely on the principle that for a 
nonconforming use to be valid and continuing, it must be used in a 
lawful manner, this lawful use continuing from before the adoption of 
the zoning law. The authority cited for this principle is Yokley, Zoning 
Law and Practice.1I In conjunction with this authority, plaintiffs cited 
Eggert v. Board of Appeals of Chicago.6 
In Eggert, the zoning ordinance7 was basically the same as that of 
Massachusetts. The holder of the use, in this case the plaintiff, owned 
an apartment building consisting of seven apartments. The issue was 
whether this use was lawful. Prior to the inception of the zoning ordi-
nance, the plaintiff had remodeled his building creating the seven 
apartments from three. This change was made without a building per-
mit and was in violation of the municipal building code. The plaintiff 
contended that although the building itself might be illegal, its use, 
§14.2. 1 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 247 N.E.2d lI64. 
2 G.L., c. 140, §§lI2A-lI2L. 
8 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, c. XVI, §16-2 (lld ed. 1965); Eggert v. 
Board of Appeals of Chicago, 29 Ill., 2d 591, 195 N.E.2d 164 (1964) . 
• Board of Selectmen of Wrentham v. Monson, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 680, 
247 N.E.2d lI64, lI65. 
II See text and note II supra. 
629 Ill. 2d 591, 195 N.E.2d 164 (1964). 
7 Chicago Zoning Ordinance, art. 6, §6.2. 
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for apartments, was not and therefore a nonconfotming use wo~ld. be 
proper. The Illinois Supreme Court found that although the buddmg 
code spoke in terms of construction reqUirements, the obvious intent 
was to include the use to which the construction was put. It therefore 
held that the use of the building, for seven apartments, was illegal and 
had been illegal at the time the zoning ordinance was passed. It was 
therefore not a lawful use and thus not entitled to continuance as a 
nonconforming use. 
The Wrentham situation, it seems, can be clearly distinguished from 
Eggert. In Eggert, the use prior to the zoning ordinance was in itself 
illegal. In Wrentham, the use~ Was leBal although"~~~t()rypro­
~S!OI!Slla,c:l ~<~!!!gn9red. If," for example, the trailer park had been 
used for parking trailers for over SO continuous days, which was illegal 
under prior Wrentham zoning, the situations would, ha.ve been anal-
ogous. Under the actual facts, however, all use requirements had been 
met and the permit was clearly issuable had application been made 
for it. In Eggert the building was illegal. Had a building permit for 
the change to seven apartments been requested, it would have been 
refused. . 
The only other case cited by the plaintiffs'in Wrentham, concerning 
the effect of failure to procure a license; was Arsenault v" Keene,8 This 
case also dealt with a' building remodeled so as to house more apart-
ments than previously. Here a two-family house was converted into 
four apartments. The first floor was converted'with a permit. The 
permit was, however, invalid, having been issued by the wrong party. 
The second floor was converted with no permit. The plaintiff's claim 
was that, although the use was illegal, it became legal by the subse-
quent passing of zoning ordinances exempting buildings and structures 
already in existence. This, according to the plaintiffs, legalized the 
previous violations 'and created a nonconforming use. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court employed a different section of the Keene zoning 
ordinance,1I which specifically stated that no change in zoning ordi-
nances should be construed as legalizing an existing 'Violation. The use 
of the property being illegal at the time of the new zoning ;ordinance, 
the Court upheld the decision of the superior court and the board' of 
adjustment that there was no continuing nonconforming use. 
This case is also distinguishable from the Wrentham case for the 
same reason as was Eggert. In Arsenault, the use prior to the zoning 
ordinance was, of itself,)lln;l, while in Wrentham it was not. The 
question of failure-nt procu a building license in Arsenault was a 
mere auxiliary issue and not in contention. There is no hint that, had 
the change to four apartments been legal and the only irregularity a 
failure to obtain a permit, the result would have been 'the same. No 
meaningful correlation between the Arsenault and Wrentham cases 
thus really exists. 
8 104 N.H. 556, 187 A.2d 60 (1962). 
II Se<:tion 25. 
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The defendant, Monson, based his case solely on the inequity of 
allowing a failure to obtain a license to negate a valid and legal use 
prior to the zoning ordinance; he properly cited Granby v. Landryl0 
for the proposition that the licensing requirements of G.L., c. 140, 
§§S2A-S2L, are not zoning requirements. The defendant cited no other 
authority to shoW that a failure to procure a license does not make an 
otherwise legal nonconforming use illegal. The Court, however, pr0-
vided several cases supporting the defendant. 
In Scavone v. Totowa~11 the owner of the use, Sandford, had oper-
ated a used car lot before the passing of a zoning ordniance prohibiting 
such enterprises in his area of location. He continued the occupation. 
For one year, however, Sandford failed to renew his license while con-
tinuing to operate his busineSs. The plaintiff claimed that the oper-
ation for one year without a license was illegal, thus destroying the 
nonconforming use. The New Jersey court, noting that zoning statutes 
are not enacted as a method of enforcing other statutes and regu-
lations, held that a prior nonconforming use need only not have been 
violative of a prior zoning ordinance. A failure to procure a license 
does not go to the use, and thus the failure did not destroy the con-
tinuance of the nonconforming use. The parallel to the Wrentham 
case is apparent. As in Scavone~ the violation was failure to procure a 
license .. The use itself was not violative of prior zoning ordinances and 
continuance should therefore not have been denied. 
Henning v. Goldman12 concerned an open air parking lot which had 
been permitted under the old zoning ordinance but was prohibited 
under the new. Here again there was a failure to procure a license to 
operate. The New York court, in sustaining the continuance of a non-
conforming use, held that the failure to procure a license "did not 
change the character or use of the premises ... :'18 The court noted 
that the owner's failure to acquire a pcense may have subjected him to 
penalties provided in the ordinance requiring licensing. The court also 
noted, in rendering its decision, that the use was open, notorious and 
continuous. Again the parallel to the Wrentham case is striking. The 
use of the land as a trailer park was open, notorious and continuous, 
and the lack of a license did not change the character of the use. The 
Henning court's reasoning would apply equally well to Wrentham. 
The case which the Supreme Judicial Court noted as being persua-
sive was Drysdale v. Beachman.u In that case, a garbage dump was 
operating in violation of sanitary regulations at the time of the passing 
of a zoning ordinance, which outlawed the operation of garbage dumps 
at that locale. The plaintiffs claimed that this operation was illegal 
and thus no nonconforming use could result. The Michigan Supreme 
Court, in finding otherwise, stated: "We do not believe that a violation 
10341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960). 
1149 N.J. Super. 423, 140 A.2d 238 (1958). 
12 8 Mise. 2d 228, 169 N.Y.s.2d 817 (1957). 
18Id. at 229, 169 N.Y.s.2d at 817. l' 359 Mich. 152, 101 N.W.2d lJ46 (1960). 
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of a provision of a regulatory ordinance necessarily destroys the law-
fulness of the basic use where compliance with the regulation can be 
had on demand and where such compliance actually follows."15 
Quoting the above language, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
Monson's nonconforming use in the present case. As in Drysdale, 
compliance with the regulation could be easily obtained. The Court 
thus held that failure to comply with local or state licensing provisions 
would not destroy a valid nonconforming use, provided the defect 
could be easily remedied.16 
By adopting the Michigan view, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
followed the apparent intent of G.L., c. 40A, §5. Under Section 5 there 
is a right to continue prior uses of land as long as those uses remain 
unchanged. It would indeed seem strange to remove that right for a 
regulatory infraction which has no effect on the basic use and which 
can be easily remedied. The result would be particularly inequitable 
where, as in the Wrentham case, there had been no notification of non-
compliance with the statutes. Also, since the provisions of G.L., c. 140, 
§§32A-32L, are not zoning regulations, they should not affect zoning 
considerations. Failure to secure a license is an independent violation 
which does not damage the use. By granting the injunction the Court 
would force the violator to comply with the law. This would mean 
that by getting the license the defendant would have complied and 
could continue as before. Without a prior demand that the violator 
secure a license and a refusal, a court proceeding seems unnecessary. 
Also, the granting of an injunction prior to a refusal of a demand 
to acquire a license would appear to be a futile action and not in keep-
ing with the principles of courts of equity. 
It might well be interesting to note, in passing, the present Wren-
tham zoning statute. Under that statute, passed in 1963, no trailer 
home is permitted in the town of Wrentham unless it is in an enclosed 
structure or to the rear of a principal building.17 A permanent mobile 
home, therefore, may not be used in Wrentham as a principal resi-
dence. 
Recent national statistics show that annual housing starts are run-
ning at the rate of about 1,300,000 each year and, of these, about 
300,000 are mobile homes. In the face of such statistics it may well 
seem strange to outlaw this form of residence. Today's mobile home is 
a far cry from the cramped trailers of yesteryear, and, similar to motels, 
their respectability is coming to be accepted. The opinion that they 
only serve lower class, migratory persons no longer represents fact. To 
ban a form of residence which accounts for approximately one quarter 
of the living units being built today may be unwise, particularly in 
view of the relatively low cost of such units. Mobile homes are well 
within the price range of the average citizen, can be ac:quired quickly 
111Id. at 155. 101 N.W.2d at l!47. 
161969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 681. 247 N.E.2d at lI65. 
17 Wrentham Zoning By-Law §l!-l! (196l!). 
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with little red tape. can be readily (if fairly expensively) financed. and 
can permit more people to be private home owners. 
§14.3. Nonconforming use: Alterations. Abbott v. Appleton NUTS-
ing Home, Inc.,l dealt with a request for a variance to permit struc-
tural changes in a nursing home. The defendant desired to change its 
building. a three-family type. so as to add 12 beds. janitorial and 
utility closets. and bathrooms. The nursing home was in violation of 
State Department of Public Health regulations owing to an insufficient 
number of closets and bathrooms. The space for 12 extra beds was 
required to make operation of the home economically feasible if it 
were to comply with the health regulations. 
The building was in an area zoned for residential purposes only. 
with nursing homes specifically disallowed. The home existed as a non-
conforming use. The requested changes were to alter the exterior ap-
pearance of the structure so that it would cease to look like a dwelling 
and would take on the appearance of· an institution. The defendant 
claimed that without the addition of the 12 beds there would be sub-
stantial economic hardship. 
The Medford Board of Appeals granted the variance. Under G.L .• 
c. 40A. §2I. Abbott. a neighbor. brought an action against both Apple-
ton and the board of appeals in superior court. Appleton demurred to 
the complaint in superior court but the demurrer was overruled. On 
the merits the superior court judge sustained the board of· appeals' 
action. Abbott appealed the final decree. and Appleton appealed the 
decree overruling the demurrer. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the overruling of the de-
murrer and reversed the granting of the variance. The Court inter-
preted a section of the Medford zoning ordinance2 permitting struc-
tural expansion for nonconforming industrial and commercial uses 
until January 1, 1970, as referring only to expansions to meet local 
structural regulations. The Court held that since the expansion here 
in question was not to meet requirements, but rather to enlarge the 
operation, the variance should not have been granted. 
The Court also held that economic nonfeasibility in the operation 
of a nonconforming use is not grounds for a claim of hardship. It 
found that the property could still be used, either as before with less 
profit or, since there was no proof to the contrary, in a different man-
ner consistent with the zoning regulations. The disadvantages were 
not confined to Appleton but were common to all nonconforming uses 
so situated. The changes required to meet health department stan-
dards present a different situation, but such limited changes are not at 
issue in this case, since the variance granted the right to increase floor 
space much more than would be required merely to comply with the 
state department regulations. 
The Medford ordinance in question is specifically designed to dis-
§14,s. ,11969 MIllS. Adv. Sh. 127. 245 N.E.2d 912. 
2 Section 11.2. 
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courage nonconforming uses. They are to be permitted to continue 
until they are removed or abandoned, but nonconforming expansion 
is not provided. This opinion is clearly in keeping with that intent. If 
the nonconforming use is not profitable, it will perhaps cease to exist. 
To permit enlargement to make the use profitable would be, in effect, 
encouraging its existence. Since this is not the desired result, the Court, 
as is its wont in this area, has interpreted the ordinance strictly. Such 
interpretation is also consistent with the presumptions involved in 
zoning ordinances. Zoning, it is presumed, is applied in the best inter-
ests of the town at large. The desire is to reserve certain areas for 
certain types of uses. A continuing nonconforming use is at variance 
with that purpose and is, indeed, frequently in a monopolistic or other-
wise advantageous position to other similar uses since they may not 
enter the area. Thus, by not allowing enlargements, or other modifi-
cations, the special treatment is egualized until such time as the non-
conforming use ceases and the zoning goals are met. 
Perhaps in the Abbott case, while the letter of the law is followed, 
the result may be undesirable in the special situation of the defendant. 
It is the zoning ordinance, however, which may be at fault and not 
the Court. The defendant here was a nursing home. The Court recog-
nizes that there is a shortage of nursing homes in Medford8 In this 
situation it would seem to be in the public interest at least not to 
unduly· restrict expansion of existing nursing homes wherever they 
might be located. Nursing ho~s are probably not nuisances as custom-
arily located and are not actually eyesores,. even if they do look like 
institutions. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court reached the proper legal 
decision under the ~edford zoning ordinance and the general rules 
governing. grants of variances, the result appears unfortunate. If the 
goal of zoning is to do away with all nonconforming uses in a given 
area, those responsible for creating those goals should be certain that 
all prohibited.uses are expendable. If they are not, as well may be the 
case here, the result may be beautifully consistent zOning, but with a 
shortage of vital services and a consequent detriment to the COID-
munity. 
In Crawford v. Building Inspector 0/ Barnstable,' the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court again considered a violation ·of a nonconforming use. The 
petitioners requested a writ of mandamus to compel the building in-
spector to revoke a building permit granted to Harbor View Realty, 
Inc. The realty company owns property on which is located a hotel 
or "club." It is located in a residentially zoned area and exists as a 
prior existing nonconforming use. The construction under attack 
consisted of blacktopping an area in front of the hotel for parking, 
enclosing a porch and stair landing at the rear of the building, and 
8 Abbott v. Appleton Nursing Home, Inc., 1969 )filii. Adv. Sh. 127, 128, 245 
N.E.2d 912, 914-
, 1969 MuI. Adv. Sh. 955, 248 N.E.2d 488. 
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building a 285-foot pier from the land behind the hotel out into the 
bay. The plaintiffs contended that each ~f these "additions" were in 
violation of the permitted nonconforming use. 
On the issue of the enclosed porch, the Court examined the effect 
the change had on the entire enclosed area of the hotel, the reason for 
the enclosing of the porch, and the effect of the enclosure on the ap-
pearance of the building. The floor space, they found, was not in-
creased at all. The enclosed space of the building was increased by one 
to two percent. The appearance of the building was improved. The 
Court, upholding the determination of the lower court, thus held that 
the porch enclosing came within minimum tolerances allowed to non-
conforming uses under the General Laws.1I The change was not detri-
mental to the neighborhood in general. 
The Court placed some emphasis on the reason for the enclosing of 
the porch. The repairs had been accomplished in response to dry 
rotting and to prevent further deterioration of the building from the 
elements. The purpose was not to enlarge the building or change its 
use. The Court summed up its reasoning by stating that "the alteration 
. . • was negligible rather than substantial and was incidental rather 
than purposeful."e Apparently, if the enlargement is for a purpose 
other than size increase, it is to be permitted if it is not substantial. 
This seems well in line with the Abbott case.' There, as noted, the 
enlargement was not allowed because its purpose was to increase the 
number of beds in the nursing home. The implication was, however, 
that if the enlargement were necessitated by structural standards it 
would have been allowed if it went no further than was necessary to 
satisfy those standards. Here, in Crawford, the danger was deterio-
ration of the building, resulting in either constant repairs or an even-
tual health and safety hazard. The changes made were minor in over-
all effect and were what was minimally necessary to accomplish the 
required end - a termination of the deterioration. 
Since the building eventually would have become unavailable for 
any use if the condition were not allowed to be corrected, that per-
mission to correct was not. an encouragement of the continuance of a 
nonconforming use. On the contrary, it was clearly a mere allowance 
to continue in the same use and to protect the building itself for any 
use. In so ruling the Supreme Judicial Court did not take an approach 
particularly favorable to nonconforming uses. It did not favor the use; 
it merely allowed it to continue. 
Concerning the addition of the pier, the defendant argued that it 
was a permissible accessory use, customarily incident to the noncon-
forming use of the land.8 The Court, reversing the lower court, found 
II C.L .• c. 4OA. 15. See IDlpector of Buildings of Burlington v. Murphy. 520'MUI. 
207. 68 N.E.2d 918 (1946). 
e Crawford v. Building IDlpector of Barnstable. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 955. 958. 
248 N.E.2d 488. 490. 
'See text at notes 1-5 ~prG. 
8 Under the Barnstable Zoning By-Law. pt. E. 
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that such was not the case. The pier was the largest in the bay, 185 feet 
larger than the town pier. It was clearly for commercial rather than 
residential purposes. The hotel did not have a pier previously. Thus 
the pier was a "new enterprise" and was scarcely a customary incident 
to a hotel in a residential area operating as a nonconforming use. 
The pier was ruled a definite structure, unlike the new blacktopped 
area created for improved parking. The blacktopping had been accom-
plished in conjunction with the pier construction. The Court found 
that no building permit was necessary for the blacktopping since it 
was not a structure. The blacktopping, in addition, was attractive and 
cut down on dust raised by cars. The pier, on the other hand, was a 
structure and also provided a new use for the portion of the premises 
facing the water. The use was new and thus not allowed to the coe-
tinuing nonconforming use property. . 
The pier was constructed under a license from the Department of 
Public Works of the Commonwealth, the locus being in and upon 
Cotuit Bay. The license grant provides no special rights, however, since 
the license is subject to all applicable laws, municipal laws, ordinances, 
and regulations, including zoning laws. Thus the pier could not be 
built without a variance since, not being of residential type, it was 
built in a residential area. 
The refusal of the Supreme Judicial Court to allow the existence of 
the pier in question is quite in keeping with its oft-stated intent not 
to aid nonconforming uses. The pier was undoubtedly an added busi-
ness venture, constructed to attract the boating public. This is certainly 
an expansion of the business and thus something not to be permitted 
in the continuing nonconforming use situation. To have allowed its 
construction would have been to permit the hotel to expand its enter-
prise. 
§14.4. Nonconforming usesc Changes in use. The question of pre-
cisely what changes are permitted to be made to, and in the use of, 
premises which are nonconforming as to local zoning, but the use of 
which is permitted because existing prior to the zoning ordinance's 
enactment,1 arose in Jasper v. Michael A. Dolan, Inc.2 Under G.L., 
c. 40A, §5, a nonconforming use· continues if in existence before the 
enactment of the zoning ordinance. However, such premises must re-
main, both as to structure and use, as they were when the zoning 
change became effective. As a result, changes in business, expansion, 
and the like have frequently been the grounds for adjudication in the 
courts. The importance of the decision to the business owner fre-
quently places the final decision with the Supreme Judicial Court. 
In Jasper, the business in question was a grocery store. At the time 
the zoning law became effective, the store sold groceries, beer and 
wine, and held a beer and wine license. The transfer of an all-liquor 
§14.4. 1 GL., c. 40A, §5. 
21968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 242 N.E.2d 540. 
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license from another location to that of the grocery store, and rescis-
sion of the beer and wine license, created the question in the case. To 
comply with the terms of the license transfer, a portion of the grocery 
store was partitioned off, the sole customer entrance being from the 
street. In addition to other claims not relevant here, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the all-liquor license was a change in use from the beer 
and wine license, as was the partitioning of the store. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in deciding the case, used the three 
point test3 of Town of Bridgewater v: Chuckran.4 It determined that 
both claims were correct: the selling of all types of liquors was a signifi-
cant change, as was the partitioning of the store. The .. requested in-
junction, ordering the grocery to refrain from selling hard liquor, was 
therefore granted. 
The troublesome point of this decision is not the final issuing of the 
injunction, but the ruling that the addition of hard liquor changed 
the use. That a change from a simple store selling foodstuffs, including 
alcoholic beverages to, in effect, two stores, one selling food and the 
other alcoholic beverages, is a change in use is quite clear. That the 
change of types of alcoholic beverages sold is a change of use is not 
so clear. 
In Jasper, the Court also ruled that the change in types of licenses 
was legally permissible, and noted that a mere increase in business 
would not change the use. Ii Thus the only grounds for holding illegal 
the change from beer and wine to all liquors, relative to use, was the 
change itself. Such a rationale is troublesome, since, given a proper 
license change, all that occurs is an addition of products. Conceptually, 
the same result would be dictated if the grocery store had sold only 
Coca Cola and Seven-Up at the time of the zoning change but had 
added a full line of soft beverages later. Both additions would be 
properly described as an extension of the line, but not a change in 
products, and therefore not a change in use. 
Particularly bothersome is the possibility that this ruling can be 
applied to other expansions in products such as the above hypo-
thetical example. The effe·ct of such application might well be to 
force the owner of a nonconforming use out of business. If he could 
not add new products or expan4 lines to fill demand he would be 
hard pressed to remain in business. Such coercion to remove from the 
premises is not the intent of Chapter 40A, Section 5.8 This is distinctly 
8 "(I) Whether the use refiects the 'nature and purpose' of the use prevailing 
when the zoning by·law took effect. • . . 
"(2) Whether there is a difference in the quality or character, as well as the 
degree of use ..•• 
"(5) Whether the current use is 'different in kind in its effect on the neighbor-
hood,''' 
4851 Mass. 20, 217 N.E.2d 726 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.18. 
Ii Town of Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 816 Mass. 124, 128, 55 N.E.2d lS, 14 (1944). 
8 The intent is to allow the continuation of the use and nothing more. Ex-
pansion is definitely outside the intent. However, to create a condition .forcing 
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not the same as refusing to allow the business to expand as in Abbott 
v. Appleton Nursing Home, Inc.' It is a refusal to permit a business 
a freedom of choice as to how many and what types of given product 
he will or should carry. If this decision were carried to its extreme, a 
shoe store, for example, qualifying for a continuance of a noncon-
forming use in 1942, which carried one brand of men's shoes in the 
only two styles made at that time, could not, 15 years later, decide to 
carry other styles of each and perhaps add men's rubber overshoes, 
men's leather boots and men's sandals, even if the overall volume re-
mained the same. The simple fact is that people's demands change. To 
allow an expansion of a line of goods within the original framework, 
is certainly not encouraging the continuance of a nonconforming use, 
as would be allowing a change in products, such as, for example, if the 
hypothetical men's store were to add women's shoes and handbags. 
Allowing an expansion of an already existing line is nothing more 
than allowing the business to continue. Economic nonfeasibility aris-
ing from need to expand, either in amount of products or physical 
size, is a separate and distinct problem. To allow such expansion would 
be to favor the nonconforming use. To allow addition of different 
products of the same species would not. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has, in the past, refused to allow a 
business to take advantage of extensive technological advancements 
in equipment,8 and to expand from a part-time business to a full-time 
business with no appreciable change in the actual use of the land it-
seH.9 These cases, at least initially, seem to be similar to Jasper. 
Whether the Jasper problem actually falls into either of these classes is, 
however, questionable. It does not seem that new products in a given 
line would be technological advancements as long as they remain of 
the same type as the original. In Town of Seekonk v. Anthony,10 the 
changes found violative were in cement-producing equipment. To be 
truly analogous to the change in Jasper, it would seem that the change 
would have had to have been in the cement itself, a new type for ex-
ample, not in the equipment producing it. If, in Jasper, new equip-
ment had been added to produce hard liquor instead of just beer and 
wine, the situation would have been comparable to that of Seekonk. 
likewise, the 'town Of Wellesley v. Bross.'11, case does not really seem 
to apply, unless "time" can be interdlanged with "liquor.'" A change 
to full time does not ieem to relate well to a change to a full line of 
liquors. 
the we to terminate tln"ough inability to operate a bUaineIl, within the laDle 
physical c:onfinea, and without an expansion of types of productl, would seem to 
violate what appears to be the legialadve intent. See 114.5 supra, at 867. 
T 1969 Mall. Mv. Sh. 127, 248 N.E.2d 912, noted in I1U supra. 
8 Town of Seekonk v. Apthony, 889. Mall. 49, 157 N.E.2d 651 (1959), noted in 
1959 Ann. Surv. M .... Law 112.2. 
9TOWD of Welleu1ey v. BrOlSi, 84Q M .... 456, 164 N.E.2d 888 (1960), noted 
in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mali. Law 118.2. ' 
10889 Mall. 49, 157 N.E.2d 651 (1959). 
11 MO Maa. 456, 164, N.E.2d 888 (1960). 
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The value of Seekonk and Brossi relative to Jasper is, rather, in the 
Court's clear attempt to apply zoning very strictly, without regard to 
the economic coercion it might create. In Seekonk, by denying the use 
of technological advancements, Anthony was, for all intents and pur-
poses, forced out of the cement business. In Brossi the defendant could 
no longer ply his trade, masonry, publicly from his home; he was 
forced to undergo additional expense to house his equipment. Yet in 
neither case was the change truly substantial. The main basis for the 
results seem to have been the effect of the changes, in each case, upon 
the respective neighborhoods. In jasper, however, there seems to be no 
major effect upon the neighborhood, at least no effect beyond a pos-
sible increase in the number of customers. It is submitted that Seekonk 
and Brossi cannot be applied to jasper except in end result - the firm 
attitude of the Court - and it therefore appears that the problem of 
a change in the line is still there. Such a change does not represent 
an advancement, and is often a necessity. 
On the note of necessity, jasper begins to resemble Seekonk. In 
jasper itself, the inability to sell hard liquor will not, under the ev-
idence, put Dolan, Inc., out of business. However, the possible im-
plications of the result - the inability to expand the line - might 
well put other types of stores out of business. 
It is possible that the Court's refusal to approve the change in 
jasper is related to the particular product in question -liquor. It 
may be that the Court considers beer and wine separate and distinct 
from hard liquor, as evidenced by the two separate and distinct li-
censes available. However, the Court found that a use holding a beer 
and wine license by nonconforming use in an area too close to a 
church could change to a use holding an all-liquor license if the prop-
erty were zoned for either. Therefore, it would seem that an alcoholic 
beverage is an alcoholic beverage, be it beer, wine or hard liquor. 
Nonetheless, liquor being the special, regulated product that it is, it 
may well be that the jasper result would be different in the men's 
shoe store hypothetical noted above or in other similar circumstances. 
Which way the Court would go if the products were meats or dairy 
products, however, is a closer question, for these too are regulated 
products. 
The basic principle is, however, clear. If the Court determines that 
a change in products, use or degree of use, has taken place, the non-
conforming use will be violated. The result, as here, will be an order 
to conform. If conforming is not economically feasible the use will 
cease and the land will thenceforth have to be used in keeping with 
the new zoning ordinance. 
§I4.5. Special permits. During the 1969 SURVEY year the Supreme 
Judicial Court decided three cases involving substantive issues con-
cerning special permits. The special permit concept, particularly as 
expanded in the site plan and development approval, cluster zoning 
and planned unit development devices, continues to be stressed by 
those interested in increasing the fiexibility of zoning response to 
14
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each particular problem before a municipality. Consequently, the at-
titude of the Court toward the granting of special permits will do 
much to determine the extent to which these devices can be used 
effectively under the Commonwealth's constitution and statutes. 
In Moore v. Cataldo,l the Lexington Board of Appeals granted a 
special permit to build a nursing home in a residential district. Un-
der the Lexington zoning by-law, this use is permitted upon board 
permission when the public convenience and welfare is served and 
the use would not tend to impair the status of the neighborhood. The 
plaintiffs suggested, however, that the nursing home use would not 
be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning by-
law. The Court noted that the specific statutory conditions applicable 
to variances are not applicable to special permits, and that the con-
siderably less stringent requirements of G.L., c. 40A, §4, and the 
Lexington by-law were adequately met on the facts. The point is an 
important one and not always fully understood. Variances, as the 
very name suggests, are granted to vary the zoning regulation when 
particular stringent conditions are met. Special permits, however, are 
designed to carry out zoning objectives, not vary them. Thus, the 
essence of the difference can be described in terms of carrying out or 
modifying the zoning plan of the municipality. Permits, if subject to 
adequate standards and in accordance with community plans, should 
thus be supportable under the enabling act and, except possibly in 
some extreme cases, under the state constitution. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has, however, been constrained to 
point out on occasion that special permits are a permissive device and 
that, even if conditions for the grant of one are established, the local 
granting authority need not make the grant. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Board of Appeals of Framingham,2 the oil company had successfully 
appealed to the superior court a denial by the board of appeals of the 
grant of a permit for a service station. This lower court decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court, which stressed the point made 
above, the discretionary nature of the permit except under the 
limited exceptions set out in Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Bam-
stable.s Under that case, the board's denial can be annulled only if 
based on a legally untenable ground or if unreasonable, whimsical, 
capricious and argitrary. The Court found neither defect in this case. 
Of considerable additional interest in the Gulf Oil case was the 
Court's acceptance of the board's consideration of the possible future 
effects of the grant of the exception on the area, as long as such con-
sideration remained within reasonable limits. This is, in a sense, an 
acceptance of the rationale in Arveme Bay Construction Co. v. 
Thatcher;' which held that reasonable, although not overly lengthy, 
§14.5. 11969 Mass. Mv.Sh. 1129.249 N.E.2d 578. 
2 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 19B, 244 N.E.2d Bll. 
a BSI Mass. 555. 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954). noted in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§UI. 2.10. 14.25. 20.2. 
"278 N.Y. 222. 15 N.E.2d587 (19B8). 
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forecasts of future development can authorize the application of zon-
ing regulations that freeze the zoned land in an uneconomic status. 
This concept of the "permissible period of prediction" governs in 
various zoning areas, and it is apparent that the Court considers, quite 
correctly, that it should be applied in the special permit area. 
Harrison v. Town of BraintreelS arose from the earlier decision of 
Harrison v. Building Inspector of Braintree.6 In the earlier case it was 
held that using residentially-zoned land abutting industrially-zoned 
land for access purposes was an illegal industrial use. The town 
amended the by-law so that the board of appeals could grant access 
or egress ways to or from land in another district across residentially 
zoned land. The Court found the provision itself valid, as it was not 
necessarily inconsistent with the dominant residential purpose to per-
mit such very limited commercial or industrial uses. Nevertheless, 
the Court found that the amendment here had been adopted, as the 
planning board report had so stated, to permit this use of these parcels 
because the access use over them already existed, and that the residen-
tial areas near these parcels, which were in illegal use, were there-
fore treated differently than other residential areas otherwise similar. 
This lack of equality of treatment made the amendment invalid. The 
Court also found unreasonable, as a matter of law, the extent of the 
access use on both sides of the property of the plaintiffs. The Court 
also suggested other ways in which the town could reach the desired 
result of giving access to otherwise landlocked industrial land. This 
case suggests, of course, the care that must properly be taken when 
zoning amendments affect only special interests or small parcels within 
a town. 
§14.6. Amendments. All those experienced with zoning fully 
realize that changed conditions and circumstancees often create the 
need for changes in zoning patterns. Zoning changes, however, should 
be reasoned and planned responses, and not ad hoc, variable reac-
tions to the requests of particular landowners. The obvious facts are, 
of course, that most zoning amendments are sought by an individual 
or group of individuals who generally, if not always, see an economic 
advantage to a more permissive zoning pattern. Thus, unplanned and 
uncoordinated response is not unknown, and, when it does occur, 
the resulting amendment can often be attacked as spot zoning. Three 
such cases were decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 
1969 SURVEY year and deserve brief attention. 
Rosko v. City of Marlborough1 involved an attack on a rezoning 
resulting from the recommendation of a city planner on the basis of 
a study of how the town should react to the new Route 495's passage 
through the town. He recommended that the locus and nearby prop-
IS 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607, 247 N.E.2d 356. 
6350 Mass. 559, 215 N.E.2d 773 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §IU. 
§14.6. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 242 N.E.2d 857. 
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erty be zoned for a limited industrial district. which was done. Peti-
tioner argued that the inclusion of the particular locus occurred 
because the owners had an industrial purchaser for the property. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the lower court had been cor-
rect in denying petitioners relief and in upholding the zoning. The 
land rezoned was sufficiently differentiated from adjoining residential 
land to permit its inclusion in a different district. The Court also 
stressed that the town could consider the good of the whole town and 
its future prospects as well as present uses in zoning. The Court re-
jected out of hand the argument that there was no change of signif-
icance in the area since the original rezoning, noting that this 
information although relevant, is not controlling.2 
In Hines v. City of A.ttleboro,S the facts clearly showed that the 
tract rezoned from residential to business was surrounded by other 
residentially zoned land. and was generally occupied by residences. 
Even a portion of the locus was so used. The Supreme Judicial Court 
found no difficulty in sustaining the lower court determination that 
this was spot zoning. 
As communities age. and become more a part of the central city 
rather than suburban area, the needs for types of housing tend to 
change from single-family residence to multi-family or apartment uses. 
Even the most elementary application of the von Thunen curves 
indicates that, as urban areas increase in size and population, land 
near the center tends to increase substantially in price, and probably 
even in value. Thus, even if a demand continues for single-family 
housing, such housing is out of the economic reach of an ever-higher 
percentage of the citizens of such a community. The obvious answer 
lies in the change of zoning from single-family to apartment uses, and 
this created the issue in Vagts v. Superintendent and Inspector of 
Buildings of Cambridge.' The locus was changed from a less to more 
dense zone under Cambridge's floor area-lot area density control ratio. 
The petitioners live on a nearby quiet street of single-family homes. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the lower court's finding that 
the zone change did not constitute spot zoning. It noted that the area 
rezoned already had a number of uses permitted only in the new, 
more dense zone, and was basically similar to such zoned land across 
the street it faced, thus making it substantially dissimilar to abutting 
land to the west. The Court, while commenting that the evidence of 
damage to the petitioner'S property was unconvincing, noted that the 
fact of damage alone, even if proved,· would not render the ordinance 
invalid. 
Also in issue was the adverse recommendation of the planning 
board concerning the amendment. The Court noted that this report 
was only advisory in natureli and that evidence offered by other qual-
2 This point is discussed in 1967 Ann. Sun. Mass. Law §11.4. 
81969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 259. 244 N.E.2d 316. 
'1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 247 N.E.2d 366. 
Ii~e Court cited Noonan v. Moulton. M8 Mass. 633. 204 N.E.2d 897 (1965). 
noted m 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 8814.1. 14.15. 
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ified planners, as well as the planning director of the city, favored 
this amendment, which increased intensity of use so as to provide an 
adequate, continuing supply of housing of the type the city needs. 
None of these cases makes new law, but each effectively illustrates 
the application of established theory to the new problems confront-
ing our increasingly urbanized society. The Vagts case is particularly 
important to the extent that it reflects court support for the type of 
rezoning soon to be expected in our close-in suburbs and core cities. 
§14.7. Variances. The history of variances in Massachusetts has 
been, in terms of the pronouncements of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
one of the review and, generally, reversal of a large number of such 
cases, with a gradual reduction in the number of such cases reaching 
the Court. No doubt the admonitory decisions of the Court have had 
their effect, but there is also reason to believe the variance is still 
commonly utilized when assent of neighbors and the community 
boards and officials can be obtained, even if the legality of the variance 
as granted is questionable under G.L., c. 40A, §15(8). One may argue 
that this course can involve risks under the doctrine of Brady v. Board 
of Appeals of Westport.! 
In Planning Board of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Spring-
field,2 the applicant for the variance and the zoning board, had quite 
obviously not obtained the planning board's assent to the variance. 
In the particular zone, three-vehicle garages are permitted, but only 
one of the. vehicles may be used for commercial purposes. The ap-
plicant in this case had conducted a landscaping business for some 
50 years at the locus and sought a variance permitting the building 
of a garage for three commercial vehicles used in the business. The 
variance was granted, subject to conditions that tended not only to 
limit the effect of the storage but also to impose some limitations upon 
the entire business. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior 
court decree upholding the variance. Neither the board nor the lower 
court had made the required findings that the variance could be 
granted without substantial detriment to the public good and with-
out substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of the ordi-
nance. Since there was thus no finding that all the requirements of 
Section 15(8) were met, the grant was fatally defective. 
An interesting side issue involved the claim that the variance was 
of such small consequence as to be disregarded. The Court found it 
was not of an inconsequential nature, but the idea is nevertheless an 
interesting one for statutory development. Prerequisites for variances 
as presently set out in the enabling act are rigid; variations in con-
ditions, until they meet the strict and heavy standards of Section 15(8), 
cannot be reflected in decisions denying or granting the variance. In 
the present case the variation sought was certainly slight, but, even if 
§14.7. 1 !l48 Mass. SIS, 205 N.E.2d SIS (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass 
Law §14.l5. Attack on a previously granted variance or special permit on the 
occasion of the issuance of a building permit may well be permitted under this 
case. 
11969 M .... Adv. Sh. 401, 245 N.E.2d 454. 
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the vatiance could have been granted on the particular grounds used 
to deny it, one cannot imagine the Supreme Judicial Court on this 
record finding the type of hardship necessary for a variance. The 
use of several types of variances - at least to the extent of differentiat-
ing major use changes frQm minor ones, and major density and loca-
tional factors from minor ones - has been suggested by a number of 
planners. On the facts of the present case, of course, it would seem 
that the use of a special permit device to solve this particular type of 
problem· would be both valid and most satisfactory as providing a 
means Qf'imposing conditions protecting nearby property. The Court, 
however, faced with the statute, could only find that the variance had 
been improperly granted on these facts. 
Barbato v. Board of Appeal of Chelsea8 involved the use of an 
earlier granted variance for the purpose of "a mechanical shop." The 
new owner sought a permit to build a concrete garage for five large 
units of construction equipment. The Supreme Judicial Court sum-
marily rejected the contention that the garage use was within the 
variance. Barbato entered into the contract to buy this land in 1966, 
and the variance had been granted some 17 years earlier. Although 
there is no .certainty Barbato depended upon the variance in his pur-
chase of the land, the warning to conveyancers .whose clients wish to 
use a prior granted variance is obvious: Be certain the variance in-
cludes the' proposed use. 
§14.8. Meaning of words: Municipal use. In Ouellet v. Board of 
A ppeals of Doverl the plaintiffs owned land in Dover zoned for res-
idential purposes but, in the zone, a special permit for a "municipal 
use" could be granted by the board of appeals. The plaintiffs sought 
to lease a puilding, which they would construct on the land, to the 
United States for a post .oftice. The board held the proposed use was 
not "municipal," a determination which therefore made it unable to 
act on the plaintiffs' request. The Supreme Judicial Court, examining 
various statutes that make a distinction between "municipal" and 
"public," and the use of the two words in judicial opinions, came 
to the conclusion that "municipal" under this by-law should be given 
the narrow meaning of local, as opposed to state or federal, activity. 
The decision seems sensible in context since, as the Court noted, the 
use of the word "public" would have been very easy and natural to 
describe, governmental uses of a nonlocal nature. 
§14.9. Density controls: Yards and structures. Along with other 
devices, yard requirements are a means of controlling density and in-
tensity of devdopment in a given area. Yard requirements also relate 
to safety (particularly in case of fire), and in some extreme cases to 
health, although modem building is seldom so ill-planned that yards 
are inadequate for health reasons. Front yard requirements also relate 
. . 
a 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 181,244 N.E.2d 308. 
§14.8. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1359, 242 N.E.2d 759. 
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closely to set-back. requirements, although technically the front yard 
requirement is a zoning device and the set back a means of assuring 
health, safety and welfare in connection with the laying out and widen-
ing of roads and streets. In all yard requirements beyond the minimal, 
aesthetics as well as density and intensity control undoubtedly plays 
a part. 
Scott v. Board of Appeals of Wellesley1 raised the question of 
whether the Wellesley front-yard requirements of 30 feet were violated 
by a swimming pool which was some 25 feet from the street and whose 
fencing (required under the Wellesley by-laws) was about 12 feet from 
the street. The Supreme Judicial Court, remarking upon the substantial 
and permanent nature of the pool and its equipment, as well as the 
fact that some of it was above ground level, held the pool to be a 
structure and thus in violation of the Wellesley by-law. 
Although the point was not argued, the Court further noted the 
fact that side-yard requirements were not met, and that a hard ques-
tion exists as to whether the pool, which is possibly an "accessory 
building" under the by-law, would be exempt from side-yard require-
ments as such an accessory use. The Court suggested clarifying amend-
ments, a point well worth making at a time when pools are becoming 
an ever more popular and common addition to homes in a number 
of the suburbs. 
The Court noted that the purpose of the Wellesley by-law pro-
visions on yard and setback were not clear. As stated above, it ap-
pears fairly unlikely that health, safety or density factors were 
involved, the removal of which essentially leaves aesthetic as the 
main purpose of the application of these requirements to swimming 
pools. One might even question the substantiality of the public benefit 
obtained by such requirements to counter-balance the private loss, 
and thus raise constitutional issues.2 Although it would seem that, in 
the abstract, little private loss is suffered in moving or reducing the 
size of a pool, or even when its actual construction is prevented, regula-
tions of municipalities in which pools are being built should, at the 
minimum, certainly clarify the effect of yard requirements on what 
are becoming fairly common accessory uses in many areas. 
§14.10. Accessory uses. In the preceding section it was noted that 
the Supreme Judicial Court did not need to decide if a swimming 
pool was, under the particular by-law, an accessory use in a residential 
district.1 It would not be difficult to find, in Massachusetts suburban 
areas, that these pools are becoming a sufficiently common feature of 
§14.9. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 939, 248 N.E.2d 281. 
2 See, e.g., Jenck.es v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, lI41 Mass. 163, 167 
N.E.2d 757 (1960); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 841 
(1964). The cases are noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.3 and 1964 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §14.1. 
§14.I0. 1 Scott v. Board of Appeals of Wellesley, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 939, 248 
N.E.2d 281. 
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residential building to be appropriately found to be accessory to the 
basic use. Other uses, however, even if occasionally found to exist in 
residential districts, are so uncommon that they can hardly be treated 
as subsumed under the term "accessory" and thus are permissible only 
if specifically so designated.2 How far the concept of "accessory use" 
properly extends was the basic problem in Hume v. Building Inspec-
tor of Westford.8 One Rice maintained two kennels in eight rooms in 
his garage and, outside the garage, three runways and a large exercise 
yard. A total of 14 dogs were in the facilities at the time of the trial, 
and up to 2S had been there. The Court noted that the maintenance 
of a kennel of this size was not specifically listed as a permitted ac-
cessory to residential use under the town's by-law. The general acces-
sory clause relates to uses customarily incident to and not detrimental 
to a residential neighborhood. The Court reversed the finding of the 
lower court in this context and held that the kennel was not a per-
missibleaccessory or incidental use. 
§14.1I. Declaratory relief: Land court jurisdiction. General Laws, 
c. 240, §14A, provides that the land court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear certain cases involving the validity of a zoning regulation, includ-
ing those that purport "to restrict or limit the present or future use, 
enjoyment, improvement or development of such land, or any part 
thereof. . . ."1 It has been understood from the beginning that the 
primary purpose df this statute was to permit a person to obtain an 
adjudication concerning his use of his own land under a zoning regula-
tion, particularly when there is no basis for other declaratory relief.2 
In Rosko v. City of Marlborough,8 the Supreme Judicial Court found 
that it was perfectly permissible for petitioners whose land was within 
the rezoned area to petition the land court under this statute for relief 
from a rezoning. which they deemed adversely affected their property 
by its reclassification and by the use of other property in the area for 
the rezoned purposes. 
During the 1969 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court was faced 
for the first time with the question of whether an owner of land out-
side the rezoned area but. adversely affected by the rezoning tould 
maintain a declaratory action URder this section. In Harrison v. Town 
of Braintree,' the Court found such a petition could properly be 
2 Building Inspector of Falmouth v. Gingras., 358 Mass. 274, 154 N.E.2d 896 
(1959) ("garage" does not include storage of seaplane as accessory to residential 
use), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Man. Law §12.7. 
a 1£69 Mass. Adv. Sh. 85, 245 N.E.2d 189. 
§14.11. 1 The section also includes provisions for declaratory relief wpen the 
regulation restricts or limits present or future structures, including alterations or 
repairs; and provisions for the determination ~f the extent to which the regula-
tion affects a proposed use, enjoyment; imprbvement or development of such 
land by the erection, alteration or repair of structures thereon. . 
2 See Pitman v. City of Medford, 512 Mass. 618, 45 N .E.2d 975 (1942); Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co. v. Town of Reading, 554 Man. 181, 256 N.E.2d 188 (1968). 
81968 Mass. Adv. Sh. llI29, 242 N.E.2d 857. See §14.6 supra • 
• 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 6fY1, 247 N.E.2d 556. See also §14.5 supra. 
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brought before the land court. The Court felt that a broader con-
struction of the statute was appropriate, particularly in this period of 
overcrowded dockets, and that attention to nonsubstantive details 
should be minimized. As a result of these determinations, the Court 
held that, so long as the petitioner's land was directly affected under 
the zoning regulation by the permitted use of other land, jurisdiction 
for this declaratory action lies in the land court. 
The result is sensible and fully justified under the language of the 
statute. Readily accessible channels of relief, freed of technicalities, 
should be the goal in all procedures, but the achievement of such a 
goal is particularly important in zoning cases in which land uses have 
to be frozen awaiting the making of the decisions. 
§14.12. Appeal: Filing of copy of board decision. General Laws, 
c. 40A, §21, governs appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court from de-
cisions of a board of appeals. The section includes the statement: 
"There shall be attached to the bill a copy of the decision appealed 
from, bearing the date of filing thereof, certified by the city or town 
clerk with whom the decision was filed." In Healy v. Board of Appeals 
of Watertown,1 the Court held that failure to file a copy of the de-
cision with the notices of the bill in equity served on the defendants 
was not a jurisdictional defect.2 Since the defendant would be unlikely 
not to have a copy of the decision, the failure to file under these 
circumstances would not remotely affect the notice required for ade-
quate due process. To hold such a defect jurisdictional would be to ig-
nore the real substance of the statutory requirement. Obviously, how-
ever, not to file is to invite litigation, and the requirement should not 
be ignored. It is at least remotely possible, also, that a given party 
might not have a copy of the decision, and a serious jurisdictional 
issue might then arise. 
§14.13. Notice of public hearing: Special permits and variances. 
A public notice by the board of appeals of a hearing of issues before 
it is required to include "the subject matter, sufficient for identifica-
tion."1 The requirements concerning notice are jurisdictional, and 
failure to satisfy them ordinarily will make the board's action invalid 
and thus ineffective.2 In Moore v. Cataldo,8 the notice indicated that 
a permit was being sought for a nursing home but did not indicate 
the size of the proposed building and the number of beds to be located 
therein. The plaintiffs cited Kane v. Board of Appeals of Medford/' 
wherein it had been held that notice not indicating the use to which 
the proposed building was to be put was fatally defective. In Moore, 
§14.I2. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 921, 248 N.E.2d 1. 
2 The Court cited, for its holding, Opie v. Board of Appeals of Groton, 349 
Mass. 7!l0, 212 N.E.2d 477 (1965). 
§14.1!l. 1 G.L., c. 4OA, §17. 
2R.ousseau v. Building Inspector of Framingham, 549 Mass. !l1, 206 N.E.2d !l99 
(1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.17. 
8 1969 Mass. Adv; Sh. 1129, 249 N.E.2d 578 • 
• 275 M .... 97, 175 N.E. 1 (1950). 
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the Court noted, however, that a description of the use had been in-
cluded in the notice. The case was thus similar t6 Carson v. Board of 
Appeals of Lexington,rl in which the notice under consideration merely 
referred to the erection of a garage, although the actual garage planned 
was designed to hold 16 buses. Certainly, if Carson is correct, the 
much less likely to mislead notice in Moore must be sustained as 
adequate. In practice, of course, a fairly complete notice is desirable 
merely to avoid arguments such as had to be litigated in Moore. At-
tempts to hide or disguise the nature of a variance or special permit 
seldom are effective and, even if somehow they might occasionally 
work, they stir up the types of persistent animosity that make future 
operations under the grant" difficult. The Court is clearly correct, 
however, refusing to impose an obligation to describe the subject mat-
ter in considerable detail, since the main purpose is to give a general 
notice sufficient to caution those who may be interested. 
In Healy v. Board of Appeals of Watertown,6 the notice stated that 
both a special permit and variance were being sought, although no 
power to grant a special permit of the type involved existed under 
the by-law. The essence of the notice, however, in the opinion of 
the Court, was that a new nursing home was sought for the location. 
Thus the notice was sufficiently descriptive. 
§14.14. Appeal: Notice of filing of bill with clerk. General Laws, 
c. 40A, §21, governing the appeal authorized to the superior court 
from action by a board of appeals, states in part: "Notice of the filing 
[of the bill] with a copy of the bill in equity shall be given to such 
city or town clerk so as to be received within such twenty days."l 
The Supreme Judicial Court has construed this requirement as juris-
dictional and has not granted relief from strict compliance. Thus, in 
a rescript opinion, Bjornlund v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Marsh-
field,2 the Court held that mailed notice, which should have arrived 
within 20 days but did not becayse of mail service failure, did not meet 
the plain words of the statute, and that consequently the appeal failed. 
In Garfield v. Board of Appeals of Rockport,S the notice, to be re-
ceived within 20 days, had to be received by August I. The town 
clerk's office closed at 4 P.M., but the copy of the bill was delivered to 
the clerk at her home at 6:35 P.M. The defendant claimed that, since 
the purpose of this section was "to give interested persons 'at least con-
structive notice of the appeal,'''4< the notice should be determined 
from the state of the record at the clerk's office at its close on the pre-
II 821 Mass. 649, 75 N.E.2d 116 (1947). 
61969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 921, 248 N.E.2d 1. 
§14.14. 1 G.L., c. 4OA. §21, was amended by Acts of 1969, c. 706, which changed 
the reading of this section. See §14.17 infra. 
2858 Mass. 757, 281 N.E.2d 865 (1967). 
81969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 247 N.E.2d '120. 
41969 Mass. Adv; Sh. at 808, 247 N.E.1!d at '121. citing Carey v. Planning Board 
of Revere, 885 Mass. '140, 745, 189 N.E.2d 920, 928 (1957). 
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scribed date. The Court, recognizing the cogency of the argument, 
still noted that the statute required filing with the clerk, not in the 
clerk's office, as is required under Sections 18 and 21 for the filing of 
the board's decision. The Court pointed out, however, that filing in 
the clerk's office during normal working hours, even in the absence 
of the clerk, would be seasonable. The Court's reading of the statute is 
a precise one, but considering the purpose of the notice as the Court 
construed that purpose, one may wonder if the legislative intent was 
not to require filing at the clerk's office during regular working hours. 
The present result, although statutorily sound - if not mandatory-
seems to call for legislative reconsideration of the statutory provisions 
so that they will at least achieve consistency. 
§14.15. Amendments: Planning board ,approval and warrant no-
tice. In Johnson v. Town of Framingham,l the warrant for the town 
meeting included a proposal for the adoption of an additional use 
in a residential district - private and public golf clubs and tennis 
courts. The planning board, after hearing upon adequate notice, rec-
ommended postponing enactment of the warrant. At the town meeting 
it was voted to add an exception to the special permit section, allow-
ing the grant of a permit for private and public golf clubs of at least 
50 acres, whereupon a bill in equity was brought to determine the 
validity of the amendment. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention that the war-
rant did not give adequate notice of the action of the meeting. Un-
der G.L., c. 39, §10, the warrant is required to state the subjects acted 
upon; and actions, to be valid, must relate to the subject matter con-
tained in the warrant. The Court rejected the contentions that shift-
ing from the permitted uses section to the special permit section, 
removing tennis courts from the final adopted section, and adding 
restrictions which the planning board had no opportunity to consider, 
made the notice inadequate. It quoted from the opinion in Town 
of Burlington v. Dunn,2 in which the Court held that the statute 
only required statements of sufficient detail to apprise voters of the 
nature of the matters with which the meeting can deal. No forecast 
. of the precise action of the meeting is required. The warrant in the 
present case clearly met these rather general requirements. 
The Court felt constrained also to answer the contention that the 
planning board had had no opportunity to consider the extensive 
amendments to the warrant, and that therefore a new notice, hearing 
and recommendation of the planning board should have been re-
quired. Under G.L., c. 40A, §6, zoning regulations cannot be amended 
without a hearing before, and recommendations of, the planning 
board. On this issue the Court again cited Town of Burlington v. 
Dunn3 as controlling. The procedure had been followed and the town 
§14.l5. 1 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1271, 242 N.E.2d 420. 
2 !J18 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 24!J (1945). 
11 Ibid. 
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meeting could enact a modified version of the proposal before the 
board. Only a radically different amendment· would require a rehear-
ing.4 As the Court noted, acceptance of the plaintiff's views would 
tend to prevent the legislative process from operating freely and 
effectively. 
§14.16. Mandamus: Exhaustion of administrative remedies. It 
is a truism that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, reviewable ac-
cording to the principles of equity, and granted only when there 
exists no available administrative remedy for the petitioner.1 In Iver-
son v. Building Inspector of Dedham,2 the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedy rule was applied in an interesting fact situation. Iverson 
had received approval of a definitive subdivision plan, which he later 
wished to alter in some respects. He claimed he was entitled to make 
the proposed changes without any further approval by the planning 
board and applied fOf building permits. The building inspector ad-
vised Iverson that he would not issue the permits, and, further, that 
it would be useless to apply. For this reason, Iverson did not file for-
mal written applications for the permits and instead sought mandamus 
against the inspector. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that Iverson 
failed to submit the applications for permits and that, had they been 
refused, he had an administrative right of appeal to the local board 
of appeals. Iverson had an adequate administrative remedy that he 
did not pursue. The statement by the. inspector that it was useless to 
apply did not prevent him from applying and following the local 
procedures. In mandamus, a court's task is to review the action of 
local authorities who have had the opportunity to act in an official 
manner. The particular use of mandamus as set out in Brady v. Board 
of Appeals of Westport,S which involved enforcement of zoning regula-
tions against a third party, does not apply in situations that are essen-
tially a review of local action relative to the petitioners. 
§14.17. Legislation. Several amendments to Chapter 40A, the 
Zoning Enabling Act, were enacted during the 1969 SURVEY year, the 
most important of which relate to appeal procedures. Attorneys in 
some communities at times have apparently found it inconvenient to 
use the superior court appeal procedure under Section 21, since the 
judge who sat on the case has moved on and is not readily available 
when any papers or other items have to be brought before him. Os-
tensibly largely because of the inconvenience factor, a second appellate 
4 The Court noted Fish v. Town of Canton, lI22 Mass. 219, 77 N.E.2d 2111 (1948), 
in which the original warrant called for repeal of the entire zoning by. law. On 
colUideration it was voted to amend the requirements of two districts and shift 
some land from one district to another. This was held to be "a radically differ-
ent amendment" and thus invalid bec:auae inadequate notice had been given. 
§14.l6. 1 Church v. Building Inspector of Natick, 5411 Mass. 266, 178 N.E.2d 272 
(1961), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. La,! §§12.6, JlI.I0. 
21968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1199, 241 N.E.2d 817. 
8 lI48 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 5111 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.15. 
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procedure was adopted in which the district court of the district in 
which the land is situated may hear the appeal.1 Within 21 days after 
the filing of the decision of the board of appeals with the city or town 
clerk, a petition for review can be brought in the district court, which 
shall determine whether the decision exceeds the authority of the 
board. Those aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals may still 
appeal directly to the superior court under the procedures that have 
been a part of Section 21 since its adoption. If a district court appeal 
is taken under the new procedures, that decision is also reviewable in 
the superior court under Section 21 by filing of a bill in equity. This 
new act, although it may be helpful in some situations, does tend to 
drag out the appellate procedure by inserting an additional step in 
some cases, since there is no indication that a direct appeal from the 
district court to the Supreme Judicial Court is possible. Ordinarily, in 
land use matters even more than in other cases, time is money, and 
the addition of another review step may create undue pressures for 
compromise of issues. The new review forum provision also has the 
effect of imposing upon the district court, at this point a judiciary un-
trained in land use matters, the necessity of deciding complicated 
issues that have taken the judges of the superior court some time to 
master. It will be interesting to observe the extent to which the pro-
cedure is used and the types of decisions made. 
Section 20 of Chapter 40A was twice amended during the 1969 
SURVEY year. Acts of 1969, c. 610, changed the wording so that a vari-
ance or special permit denied by the board of appeals shall not be 
reconsidered by the board within two years of the unfavorable action, 
except by consent of all but one of the members of the planning board. 
Prior to this amendment all members of the planning board had to 
assent to a recommendation within the two-year period. The amend-
ment apparently retains the requirement of unanimity in those towns 
in which the selectmen act as the planning board. Acts of 1969, c. 870, 
also clarified the meaning of "unfavorable action" to state clearly 
what had been the generally, although not universally, accepted inter-
pretation. The new phrase at the end of the section states that annul-
ment of a favorable board decision by a court acting under Section 21 
will not be interpreted as unfavorable action under the two-year rule. 
Since the purpose of the rule is to avoid overly frequent local recon-
sideration upon changes in board membership or in response to 
particular pressures, it would seem this clarification is fully appro-
priate. It is also particularly importctnt in those situations in which 
the annulment is more on technical and procedural than major sub-
stantive grounds. 
Acts of 1969, c. 870, also amended Section 18 of Chapter 40A, by 
changing to 60 days the date upon which the board of appeals' de-
cision must be made after the filing of an appeal, application or peti-
tion. This reduces the period from 90 days. The change certainly 
§14.17. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 706, amending G~., c. 40A, §21. 
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imposes no undue burdens on boards of appeals, which could generally 
act very promptly on all but exceedingly complicated cases. The 
desirability of accelerating the land use control devices also supports 
the reduction of this time period. 
Section 5 of Chapter 40A governs the applicability of zoning to 
existing structures and uses and has .included within its terms some 
rather special rights for agricultural and "imilar. land uses. Thus, 
zoning regulations can regulate the non-use of nonconforming buildings 
and structures so as not to prolong their life unduly; but an exception 
was made allowing for alteration, rebuilding and expansion of build-
ings used primarily for agriculture, horticulture or floriculture. An 
exception to this exception, that of greenhouses located in residential 
districts, was deleted in the 1969 SURVEY year.2 The purpose of the 
amendment, as a matter of zoning theory, escapes ready detection, 
although one can assume, as a practical matter, that the owners of 
certain nonconforming greenhouses in residential areas are now sleep-
ing better. 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§14.l8. Freeze of :zoning law upon approval of plan. G.L., c. 40A, 
§7A, protects land in approved subdivisions from chang~d zoning re-
quirements for a period of seven years in certain cirCllmstances. When 
zoning in a community is relatively unsophisticated, the results can be 
at the minimum very surprising for the municipality. In McCar.thy v." 
Board of Appeals of Ashland,1 the zoning law in effect when the sub-
division was approved permitted any. residential use, Several years 
later residential uses were divided and ·the locus was placed in "Res-
idence A," for single-family residences. Within the five-year period 
then applicable,2 a new owner requested a permit for an apartment 
building to be located on one of the lots in the approved subdivision. 
Denial of the permit by the building inspector, citing the new 
zoning law, was affirmed by the local board of appeals. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, however, upheld the superior court's determination 
that the denial of the permit be annulled. 
The language of Section 7 A specifically states that the zpning regula-
tion in effect shall govern the land shown on the subdivision. The 
town pointed out, however, that the planning board expected, when 
it approved the plan, that the subdivision would be used for single-
family residences. The Court's opinion correctly points out that such 
implied conditions cannot exist under the subdivision control law.8 
Section 81Qof Chapter 41 forbids express, much less implied, condi-
2 Acts of 1969, c. 572, amending C.L., c. 4OA, §5. 
§14.18. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1165, .241 N.E.2d 840. 
2 The period of freeze was changed to seven years in 1965, but the five-year 
period was applicable to the plan, which was approved in December 1962. 
8 C.L., c. 41, §§8IK-81GG. 
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tions in the planning board's rules and regulations relating to place-
ment and use of lots and buildings, except to permit its requiring 
compliance with the zoning regulations. Thus, the planning board 
could not have conditioned their approval on a specific requirement 
that the land be used for single-family dwellings, since the zoning in 
effect permitted any residential use. The remedy for this problem, of 
course~ does not lie in the powers and obligations of the planning 
board under subdivision control but in appropriate, well-planned 
zoning regulations. If they represent farseeing and well-thought-out 
plans of the municipality about future development, even the seven-
year freeze will not be likely to present the town with unpleasant and 
unexpected surpriSes. 
§I4~I9. Approval of plan: Planning board failure to act. The 
subdivision control law requires prompt a-ction on plari submissions 
by planning boards, and failure to act within the prescribed time and 
failure to notify concerning this action can result in the automatic 
approval of the plan. Under Section 81U of Chapter 41, failure of the 
board either to take final action or to file with the municipal clerk 
a certificate of such action will result in constructive approval of a 
definitive plan.1 In Kay-Vee Realty Co. v. Town Clerk of Ludlow,2 
the failure of the planning board to exercise care in a somewhat con-
fusing situation resulted in an approval of the plan by default. 
The petitioner, after submission of his plan, obtained permission 
for extensions of time, the last to extend to May 28, 1966, the board 
stating that no final action would be taken by it before that date. On 
May 12, 1966, however, the board notified the applicant by letter that, 
if nothing further was received frOm him· by May 23, "we will have 
to disapprove" the subdivision because of sanitary conditions noted by 
the local board of health. On May 18, 1966, the planning board filed 
a carbon of this latter letter with the town clerk. 
The Supreme Judicial Court first noted that the board did not take 
any "final action." The May 12th letter ~ght be arguably so but in 
connection with the earlier letter indicating no final action would be 
taken until May 28, ambiguity existed where certainty is required. 
Even if this were final action. however. the board failed to file a 
certificate of this action with the town clerk. The carbon copy was not 
a certificate.· since. at the minimum. a certificate must be a written 
statement that some act has or has not been done. The certificate 
requirement was statutorily imposed so that all interested parties could 
rely upon the recorded action or its absence. Anyone reading the May 
12th letter would have no way ~f determining if approval was or was 
not finally given. 
§14.I9. 1 Other automatic provisions include a I4-day period to determine if a 
plan submitted as not requiring approval does require it, G.L .. , c. 41, §SIP; and 
approval by default of the sanitary conditions of the plan by the board of health 
if no report is submitted by that board and the planning board within 45 days of 
filing. G.1.., c. 41, SlU. 
21969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 71. 2411 N.E.2d Sill. 
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The Court distinguished cases in which the certificate was not filed 
but in which the applicant had, by appealing under Section BIBB of 
Chapter 41, treated the planning board's action as final.s By so doing, 
since no one other than the applicant was affetted, the Court did not 
require strict compliance with the statute. But, in the Kay-Vee Realty 
Co. case, the applicant did not treat the board action as final and the 
case was thus controlled by the holding of Selectmen of Pembroke v. 
R. & P. Realty Corp •• In this latter case constructive approval was 
found even when the applicant received a letter during the 6O-day 
period stating the plan was approved subject to eight conditions, but 
no certificate was filed with .the town clerk. The applicant did not 
treat the action as final and, again, no one would know if the approval 
was final when conditions, not indicated as accepted, were imposed. 
The Court thus found in lKay-Vee Realty Co. that the petitioner was 
entitled to a certificate that the plan was constructively approved. 
Subdivision control could not exist without being unduly rigid if 
provision did not exist for altering, modifying and even rescinding 
approved plans, and Section BIW gives that power to the planning 
board, acting on its own motion or that of any interested party. In 
the present case, faced with the fact that approval was obviously not 
intended - and, if the board of health report was correct, even some-
what dangerous on health matters - the Court modified the judgment 
below by giving the planning beard, if it wished, 60 days to take ac-
tion under Section BIW.cs Thi$ result is clearly reasonable but one 
may well wonder at the effectiveness of a plan approved constructively 
if the courts are going to give planning boards a second chance before 
the applicant has taken the type of action under Section BIW that 
would protect his buyers and mortgagees. The Court's interpretation 
may well reflect its own qoubts as to the real advantages, considering 
the purposes of the subdivision control law,' of constructive approval 
of plans. The layout of a subdivision will generally impress upon the 
land a pattern, both of ways and in health matters, that is basically 
permanent. To permit such a far-reaching result to be reached by 
default can hardly be encouraged. The result of the present case may 
present an at least acceptable compromise of the policies - consider-
ing the statutory limitations - by giving the planning board a second 
chance but only if it is willing to litigate the issue with the developer. 
8 The Court dilCUlSed Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough, !4O Mass. 
157, 16! N.E.2d 14 (1959), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §l!I.7. See also 
Doliner v. Pla~ning Board of Millis, !4! Mass. I, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961) • 
• !148 Mass. 120, 202 N.E.2d 409 (19M), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.20. 
csSection 81W limits the planning boards' power to amend, modify or rescind 
as to lots sold or JJl.ortgaged in good faith after the original approval. But see 
Section 8lDD, which provides for damages under Chapter 79, the basic eminent 
domain statute, which may pollibly give a planning board, at some cost to the 
municipality, some powers of change even as to protected lots. 
6 G.L., c. 41, §81M, sets out the purposes for which subdivision powers are 
to be exercised. 
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One might suggest, however, that this type of case would be well 
served by the application of the Section 8IBB provision that would 
assess costs against the board if it acted in bad faith or with gross 
negligence. If this failure to act is not gross negligence under the 
Massachusetts law, as it appears not to be, an amendment to 8lBB 
to cover this particular case would be appropriate. 
§14.20. Approval not required plan: Effect of prior unapproved 
plan. In Waldor Realty Corp. v. Planning Board of Westborough,l 
Waldor had submitted a subdivision plan that was disapproved. It 
later submitted a plan for a portion of the original tract, seeking 
endorsement of this plan as one not requiring approval.2 The defen-
dant planning board sought to amend its answer to indicate that the 
plan covered part of a disapproved subdivision plan that was on 
appeal to the superior court, but the lower court refused to accept 
the amendment and ordered that the planning board decision to deny 
endorsement be annulled. 
The lower court decision was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Even if the planning board's amended answer had been re-
ceived, the subdivision control law includes no provisions preventing 
the filing of the second plan. Under Section 8lL of Chapter 41, the 
plan covered a division of a tract that does not meet the definition 
of subdivision, as do those divisions requiring approval, since all lots 
of the present plans had frontage on a public way and the lots met 
zoning requirements. Thus Waldor was entitled to its endorsement. 
The case seems fully correct on its facts, even if the planning board 
must have experienced some frustration with the result. If health 
problems are involved - access is established by the public way - it 
might not be unwise to amend the statute to prevent this automatic 
approval under undesirable conditions. It is difficult to believe, how-
ever, that other health regulations cannot prevent the creation of 
dangerous conditions on the locus. 
§14.21. Ways: Change in grade. In Crowley v. J. C. Ryan Con-
struction Co.,1 the petitioner had purchased a lot in 1962 and had 
built upon it. Bordering the lot was a private way, a dirt roadway. 
In 1964 a subdivision plan, properly approved, included the lot essen-
tially across the private way. In developing this lot, the defendant 
Ryan raised the level of the roadway two and a half feet and paved 
it. The petitioner's lot thus was placed at a level substantially below 
the roadway and other built-up lots on the area. The lower court . 
granted a mandatory injunction to the Crowleys, requiring Ryan to 
lower the grade of the way as it abuts the Crowley dwelling. 
The Court rejected analogies to Guillet v. Livernois,2 where an 
abutter was permitted to put a private way, presently unusable, into 
§14.20. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1159, 241 N.E.2d 845. 
2 G.L., c. 41, §81P. 
§14.21. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. SOl, 247 N.E.2d 714. 
:I 297 Mass. 557, 8 N.E.2d 921 (1957). 
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satisfactory condition throughout both its length and width. The 
Court noted that even in this case it was necessary that the rights and 
interests of others be preserved in establishing the grade of the way. 
The Court pointed out that the Livernois case itself discussed Killion 
v. Kelley,S which it felt was controlling. The Killion case established 
the rule that the co-owner of a private way could not make any 
change that would make the way less convenient and useful, in an 
appreciable extent, to those who also have a right to use the way. 
The fact that Ryan's subdivision plan was approved by the plan-
ning board gave no rights that could be exercised to deprive the 
Crowleys of their rights. The Court cited Toothaker v. Planning Board 
of Billerica,· which had noted that separate lots in an early subdivision 
plan, that had been sold off to individual owners, were protected from 
change or modification by later planning board conditions imposed on 
the remaining unsold section of the subdivision. Ii The same principle 
can fairly be applied to the very similar facts of the present case, so 
that mere planning board approval could not bar rights appurtenant 
to a lot abutting on the subdivision. 
§14.22. Underground wiring in subdivisions. In Sansoucy v. 
Planning Board of Worcester,l the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a 
rule of the board that underground wiring would be required in new 
subdivisions. The Court had some minor difficulty with Section 8IQ 
of Chapter 41, which speaks in terms of rules and regulations govern-
ing the installation of municipal services, whereas the telephone, elec-
trical and other wiring placed underground are usually installed by 
regulated utilities. Any possible residual doubt was removed by Acts 
of 1969, c. 884, which amended Section 81Q to insert a sentence 
specifically authorizing rules and regulations requiring underground 
wiring. Section 81M, setting forth the purposes for which the sub-
division control law was enacted, also was amended to refer specifically 
to underground wiring. Any lingering doubts that this type of regula-
tion is adopted solely for aesthetic reasons, and thus constitutionally 
doubtful, were removed.2 
Chapter 884 also amended Chapter 166 of the General Laws ex-
tensively in order to set up a scheme by which municipalities can, 
under certain circumstances, require the installation of underground 
wiring or, at the expense of the utility, directly install a limited 
amount of underground utilities. The statute is too detailed for full 
discussion but it will have considerable importance in many com-
munities. 
S 120 Mass. 47 (1876). 
4346 Mass. 436, 193 N.E.2d 582 (1963), not~d in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.15. 
II G.L., c. 41, §81FF, appli~d. 
§14.22. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 603, 246 N.E.2d 811. 
2 But S~~ Opinion of th~ JUitic~, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955), in 
which historic district zoning was sustainoo. 
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C. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§14.23. Evidence of land value: Basis for expert opinion. During 
the 1969 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court had occasion to 
consider the problem of exclusion of evidence concerning the value of 
property being taken by eminent domain. The question concerned 
the opinion of expert appraisers who had, or had possibly, formed 
their opinions using improper methods, considering improper factors, 
or taking into account improper conditions. The Court determined 
that, where such opinions were founded improperly, they could be 
excluded in the discretion of the trial judge. It further determined that 
oral examination should be permitted to determine upon what basis 
and under what conditions the expert formed his opinion. 
The case under consideration was Lipinski v. Lynn Redevelopment 
Authority.l The petitioner owned a building in an area of Lynn 
zoned for businesses. The building housed two stores, a business of-
fice, and a dance hall. In contention was the value of the property. No 
other comparable property existed in Lynn. Part of the opinion con-
sidered the method of assessing value. That portion will not be dis-
cussed here.2 
In the Lipinski case the superior court judge refused to allow an 
expert to give his opinion as to the effect of an impending taking of 
property by eminent domain on the market value of real estate in 
the area of the taking. The petitioner was trying to show that the 
values were for this reason depressed, which would affect the actual 
amount that should be paid as just compensation. The Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the judge'S refusal on the grounds that the 
question had been phrased too broadly. The question was general in 
nature and not related to the specific taking in question. The Court 
said that it was within the discretion of the judge to exclude a ques-
tion on grounds of its being overbroad. 
Essentially the same issue was the basis of another point of appeal, 
which concerned another excluded question that pertained to the 
effect upon rental value of the authority's appraiser coming to the 
property a year before the taking. Since the authority'S appraiser had 
based his valuation of the property partially upon the rental income 
of the property, a decreased rental value caused by such a visit could 
decrease the fair market value determined by the appraisal. 
Under G.L., c. 79, §12, a landowner whose land is taken by eminent 
domain is entitled to damages equal to the value of the property 
"before the recording of the order of taking." This has been inter-
preted as meaning before any of the public work requiring the tak-
ing has commenced.s Thus if a visit by an appraiser a year before the 
§14.25. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 505, 246 N.E.2d 429. 
2 For a full discussion of the determination of the value of the property taken 
by eminent domain, see 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, c. 19. 
8 Alden v. Commonwealth, 551 Mass. 85, 217 N.E.2d 745 (1966). noted in 1966 
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taking depressed the value of the land, an appraisal made after that 
visit would be an improper basis for the awarding of damages. Any 
awarding of damages would have to be at a value before the initial 
visit of the appraiser in order to conform with the mandate of G.L., 
c. 79, §12. 
According to the Court, Lipinski is the first Massachusetts case to 
broach the question of depressed value after news of a forthcoming 
eminent domain taking. There have, however, been cases which con-
sidered inflated values caused by knowledge of taking.4 Those cases 
held that the landowner was not allowed the advantage of the value 
increase caused by the very improvement· for which the land was be-
ing taken. The Court determined in the present case that a decrease 
in value was exactly the same as an increase in its effect upon the 
amount owed the landowner. Just as no advantage could come from 
knowledge of an upcoming eminent domain taking, likewise no dis-
advantage can be justified. 
The Court thus ruled that the excluded question, intended to de-
termine whether the appraisal proffered by the city was based on 
rental values already depressed by knowledge of the taking, should 
have been allowed. As a result, a new trial was in order. At the new 
trial it would be proper to determine if Lynn's appraisal was made 
under depressed rental conditions. If such were the case the opinions 
of value offered by the authority's appraisers would have to be ex-
cluded. Reliance would have to be placed either on values· prior to 
the initial visit of the authority's appraiser or upon other means of 
value determination. 
The interpretation by the Supreme Judicial Court in Lipinski 
relative to G.L.,c. 79, §12, is undoubtedly proper. The correlation 
between increased value and decreased value is clear. If the owner of 
land may not gain from knowledge of an imminent eminent domain 
taking, certainly the taking agency should not gain if, instead of in-
creasing, the values drop. It therefore seems completely reasonable 
and proper that values to be used in establishing damages be those 
existing before any public action is taken, where such action should 
conceivably inform the public of the forthcoming taking and affect 
the land values. For the city's interests, this may necessitate a change 
in appraisal procedure, but it is clear that any other rule would be 
inequitable and not in keeping with statutory requirements. 
§14.24. Intergovernmental takings and transfers. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has firmly established the rule that public lands 
cannot be diverted from one public use to another inconsistent use 
without express authorization by the General Court.1 Robbins v. De-
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§15.27, 25.2; 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.2. Connor v. 
Metropolitan District Water Supply Commn., 314 Mass. 33, 49 N.E.2d 593 (1943). 
4 Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959); Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N.E. 666 (1911)., 
§14.24. 1 Sacal v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 
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partment of Public Works2 well indicates just how plain and express 
the legislative authorization must be. Land owned by the Metropolitan 
District Commission and used for park land was included in an order 
of taking by the Department of Public Works. The relevant statute 
states that any commissioner having control of any land of the Com-
monwealth may, with the consent of the Governor and Executive 
Council, transfer to another state department land that may be neces-
sary for the laying out or relocation of a highway.s The language 
seems to fit the facts of the present case very closely but the Court 
found the language inadequate to authorize the particular taking. The 
statute did not identify the land to be taken so there was no specific 
legislative recognition of the existing public use. To satisfy the stan-
dard the legislation must clearly express not only the public will for 
the new use but also the public willingness to surrender the present 
specific use. Identification of the lands involved, a clear indication of 
the existence of the present use, and an intent to surrender the land 
to the inconsistent other use are required if legislation is to be effective 
under this doctrine. 
§14.25. Comparable sales. The issue of admissibility of com-
parable sales in eminent domain proceedings has been discussed by 
the Supreme Judicial Court over a number of years, but problems in 
the application of doctrine still exist.1 In Nonni v. Commonwealth2 
the question of admissibility of certain comparables was again the 
issue. The trial judge had admitted as a comparable evidence of the 
price of certain land that did not have sand or gravel thereon or a 
possible permit or nonconforming use in connection therewith. In 
tum, the judge refused to admit evidence as to other land presently 
in use for a sand and gravel business, with substantial deposits 
thereon. The taking involved a 300-foot strip containing some 10 
acres of an original tract of about 130 acres, bisecting the property 
nearly in half, to be used as a non-access highway. The petitioners 
had done some intermittent mining and sale of sand and gravel, which 
was a nonconforming use after adoption of a zoning by-law in 1958. 
In 1960 the local board of appeals voted to grant petitioners a vari-
ance for a gravel plant operation. Plans were filed but no plant had 
been built at the time of taking. The record book of permits in the 
town manager's office contained ink records of the permits, with un-
dated pencil notations that they were voided because they were is-
sued in error and the petitioners failed to make use of the variance 
in time.s 
The Court, on the issue of comparables, again stressed the wide 
range of discretion given to the trial judge. Thus, the refusal to admit 
evidence as to the other sand and gravel business property was sus-
(1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §IUi Commonwealth v. Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority, !!46 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481 (196!!), noted in 196!! Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §1!!.15. Both cases discuss this issue in some detail. 
21969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 249, 244 N.E.2d 577. 
S G.L .• c. SO, §44A. 
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tained, although the Court noted it would also not have disagreed had 
it been admitted. Objections to the charges by the petitioner were 
rejected, either as requiring a particular finding on conflicting ev-
idence or as being adequately covered in other instructions given by 
the judge. 
The comparability of similar property and the method of determin-
ing its value involve complex problems of fact resolution. The rule 
of the Court that leaves the admissibility of evidence of comparables 
to the trial judge, except in extraordinary cases, constitutes the only 
really feasible method of assuring that full consideration can be given 
to all evidence offered or presented in the court room. The Court 
on appeal will not, except in very unusual cases, have an equal op-
portunity with the trial judge of evaluating the offered evidence in 
the context of the case. Parties will naturally disagree with the rulings 
of the trial judge as to a number of specific offers of evidence of 
comparables, but not alternative system seems likely in the usual case 
to produce better or even equal results. 
D. URBAN RENEWAL AND HOUSING 
§ 14.26. Legislation. The housing and urban renewal legislation 
of the Commonwealth was adopted piece-meal over a number of 
years, with the result that contradictions of policies and rules existed, 
and a lawyer or anyone working with legislation had a difficult time 
even comprehending the complexities, many of which were unneces-
sary. During the 1969 legislative session the General Court adopted 
Chapter 751 of the Acts of 1969, which recodified the housing and 
urban renewal law of the Commonwealth into a new Chapter 12lB of 
the General Laws.1 Some six years of work, with continual redrafting 
and sharpening, has produced an integrated, comprehensible code that 
will facilitate the work of all involved in these fields. The goal was 
not to make more than the relatively minor changes necessary for 
efficiency, updating and the resolution of policy conflicts. The new 
code is, of course, lengthy,· and, by the nature of the subject matter, 
§14.25. 1 An extensive review of the Massachusetts law is contained in 1967 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, c. 19. See especially §19.2 for a discussion of comparable 
sales. 
21969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069,249 N.E.2d 644. 
8 The evidentiary issue on the pencilled notations was settled in favor of admis-
sion of all of the record, including the pencil notations. 
§14.26. 1 The subheadings of the chapter give an excellent indication of the 
full coverage. After a long definitional section and a typical severability section 
as to unconstitutionality and severability, the headings are Operating Agencies, 
Powers and Liabilities of Operating Agencies, Municipal Powers and Liabilities, 
Housing Programs, Veterans and Relocation Housing, Housing for the Elderly, 
Rental Assistance Program, Urban Renewal Programs, State Aid for Urban Re-
newal, and Other Programs (Rehabilitation and Conservation). 
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still complex, so no attempt will be made here to summarize its pro-
visions. Initial impressions are that the new code is working well. 
Certainly it provides a meaningful, sensible base and, when necessary 
change must be made, it can be done with some assurance of con-
sistency and comprehensibility. 
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